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IN THE SUPREME c.OURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SYLVIA HILL and ANN RASMUSSON, the 
Co-Executors of the Estate of Lila Shand Anderson, 
deceased, and SYLVIA HILL and ANN 
RASMUSSON, individually, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants Case 
-VS.-
SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
CAROLYN A. JENSEN, Administratrix of the 
Estate of A. Paul Anderson, also known as Archie 
Paul Anderson, deceased. 
Intervenor and Respondent. 1 
APPELLANTS BRIEF 
No. 
11268 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
A second marriage husband and wife were killed 
in a common disaster when their home in which they 
were living was destroyed by fire. This is a case to 
determine which estate, the descendants of the hus-
band or the descendents of the wife, are entitled to the 
loss payable under the home fire insurance policy. The 
wife (predecessor of the Plaintiff-Appellants) was the 
record title owner of the parcel of real property 
on which the home was located which was de-
stroyed. She was also the owner of the great majority 
of the destroyed personal property located in the home. 
The husband (predecessor of Defendant-Respond-
ent) was the owner of the Fire Insurance Policy cover-
ing the home and furniture. The Fire Insurance Com-
pany (defendant) on stipulation paid the policy pro-
ceeds into court. The court ruled that even though the 
home destroyed belonged to the deceased wife, and 
she was the owner of furniture and effects destroyed, 
the fire insurance policy was ownd by the husband, that 
he had an insurable interest in the hvme and furniture 
and his administrator was entitled to the proceeds from 
the fire insurance policy. The Appellants contend that 
the proceeds from the fire insurance policy should be 
payable to the Administratrix of deceased husband 
only to hold same in trust or as an agent for the owner 
(Appellants) of the home and furniture and personal 
property destroyed. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court found that A. Paul Anderson, de-
ceased husband, was the owner of and paid premiums 
nn the Fire Insurance Policy which insured the parcel 
;,f re:1l property with home located thereon and contents 
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--, .... , . 
therein owned by his wife, Lila Shand Anderson. ThE 
court held that A. Paul Anderson had an insurable in-
terest in the property and that he was entitled to the 
proceeds from the insurance policy on fire loss as 
against the claims of the owner of the properties de-
stroyed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek to have the Supreme Court de. 
Clare that where an insured insures property real or 
personal belonging to another, he is acting as an agent 
or trustee for the real owner, and that in the event of 
loss all proceeds in excess of his interest he holds in 
trust for the real owner. In this case the properties de· 
~troyed belonged to the appellants and the proceeds re· 
ceived from the insurance company from the fire loss 
~hould be impressed with a trust and held by the Ad· 
ministratrix of A. Paul Anderson's Estate for the ap· 
pellants benefit. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts of the controversy involved in this law· 
suit were generally stipulated into the record, there be· 
ing no controversy concerning them. They are basical· 
ly set forth as follows : 
Lila Shand Anderson (predecessor of Plaintiff· 
Appellants) and Paul Anderson (predecessor of Inter· 
venor-Respondent), a widow and widower from prior 
marriages and each having families by said prior mar· 
riages, married each other at Las Vegas, Nevada~ 
on September 25, 1964. At the time of their marriage 
each had their own separate estate, which they had ac· 
cumulated during their lifetime. Lila Shand Ande~on 
was the mother of two daughters, who are the Plain-
tiffs-Appellants in this action. Paul Anderson was the 
father off our children, one of whom is the Administra-
trix of his Estate and is the Respondent in this action. 
Paul and Lila Anderson lived in a home located on 
a parcel of real property in Salina, Utah. This home 
had been the residence of Paul and his former deceased 
wife, Adelia Anderson. After his marriage to Lila 
Shand Anderson, he conveyed the title to her, and she, 
using her own separate funds completely remodeled, 
added on, changed the appearance and modified the 
said home. Both Mr. and Mrs. Anderson were killed in 
a fire which completely destroyed the said residence on 
March 19, 1967. 
The home in which Mr. and Mrs. Anderson lived 
was originally purchased by Paul Anderson's former 
spouse, Adelia Anderson, from Melvin A. Doane, et ux 
on or about the 3rd day of June, 1957. This was by a 
Warranty Deed to Adelia Anderson. At the time of 
this original purchase there was a real estate mortgage 
in existence which Mrs. Adelia Anderson (Paul An-
derson's first wife) assumed, and which mortgage was 
still in existence at the time of the fire loss. It was dated 
December 1, 1949 and the original note was for 
$8,000.00, (Exhibit 8). There was also a fire insur-
ance policy deposited with mortgage holder which was 
made payable, as the interest appeared to the mortgage 
holder and Mr. Paul Anderson. The policy was renewed 
every three years, the last renewal being dated 
the 31st day of May, 1966. The indebtedness on the note 
and mortgage (still in name of owners prior to the 
Andersons) was payable at the rate of $52.54 plus an 
amount on a tax and insurance account each month. 
The mortgage holder maintained the tax and insurance 
account, and out of part of the payments made each 
-5-
month the proceeds were accumulated to pay the taxes 
annually due upon the property, and to pay the fire 
insurance premiums as they became due. At the time 
of the fire loss the fire insurance policy was in the name 
of Paul Anderson, and the loss payable clause on the 
fire insurance policy was payable as their interest ap-
peared to the mortgage holder, Grove Mortgage Com-
pany, and Paul Anderson. 
The evidence is that after the marriage of Lila 
Shand Anderson and Paul Anderson on the 25th day of 
September, 1964, Paul Anderson conveyed to Lila 
Shand Anderson, his wife, the parcel of real property 
with home located thereon. See Exhibit I Warranty 
Deed dated October 15, 1965. 
There was evidence offered that immediately be-
fore and after said conveyance, Lila Shand Anderson, 
using her own separate funds, substantially added on 
the outside of the home, completely remodeled the in· 
side of the home, and expended sums as shown by Ex-
hibits 10, 11, and 12, in excess of $16,484.00. She fur· 
ther purchased new furniture, fixtures and equipment, 
and completely refinished the home, and expended 
sums in excess of $13,171.87, as shown by Exhibits 13, 
17, 18, 19 and 20. There is no dispute but that all of 
these funds expended were out of the personal es· 
tate of the said Lila Shand Anderson. Mrs. Anderson 
also purchased a contiguous parcel of property, as 
shown by Exhibit 2, which was used in conjunction 
with the home property. 
At the time of the deaths of Mr. and Mrs. Ander· 
son, the decedent, Lila Shand Anderson, left by her Last 
Will and Testament (Exhibit 9) a life estate in the said 
home to Paul Anderson, with the remainder to her tw0 
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daughters, the Appellants in this action. Paul Ander-
son died intestate, and his estate will be divided equally 
among his four children. The question involved is who 
is entitled to the fire insurance policy proceeds which 
were payable for the destroyed home and personal con-
tents. 
Exhibit 16 shows the home remodeling plans 
with contractor, Valley Builders. Exhibit 12 shows 
payment to contractor of $9,091.55 for the re-
modeling. Exhibit 10 shows payment to contractor 
Venitelle of $6,000.00 for remodeling. Exhibit 11 shows 
payment to Painting Contractor Edwards of $1,392.96. 
Mrs. Lila Shand Anderson completely refur-
nished and redecorated the home. Exhibit 13 consists of 
23 checks for furniture and furnishings in sum of 
$6,659.52, Exhibit 17 for $2,496.59 for furniture and 
effects, Exhibit 18, $1, 705.23 for an Air Conditioner, 
Exhibit 19 for $1, 705.23 for landscaping and Exhibit 
20 for Exercycle, $952.43. All was destroyed in the fire. 
Both parties also listed numerous items of old personal 
property that was owned by the decedents which was 
also destroyed by the fire. 
The Respondents claim the policy of fire insurance 
was a personal contract, that Paul Anderson had an 
insurable interest in the property which was destroyed. 
The appellants contend that while the proceeds of the 
policy are payable to the Administratrix of this estate 
the proceeds should be impressed with a trust in favor 
of Appellants who were entitled to the properties de-
stroyed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: DOES A HUSBAND HA VE SUCH 
AN INSURABLE INTEREST IN HIS WIFE'S 
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REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY THAT HE 
CAN TAKE A FIRE INSURANCE POLICY OUT 
ON SAID PROPERTIES AND UPON THE DE-
STRUCTION OF SAME KEEP THE PROCEEDS 
PAYABLE FOR THE LOSS, WITHOUT HOLDING 
SAME IN TRUST FOR HIS WIFE AND THE sue. 
CESSOR OWNERS OF THE SAID DESTROYED 
PROPERTY? 
POINT II: IN THE EVENT A FIRE INSUR-
ANCE POLICY IS MAINTAINED AND PAID FOR 
BY A CREDITOR WHO ACCUMULATES A TAX 
AND INSURANCE ACCOUNT OUT OF MONTHLY 
PAYMENTS PAID ON THE OBLIGATION, ARE 
THE PROCEEDS PAYABLE UPON SUCH FIRE 
FIRE LOSS DESTROYING THE SAID PROPERTY 
PAYABLE FOR THE BENEFIT FOR THE REC-
ORD OWNER OF SAID POLICY, OR FOR THE 
BENEFIT OF THE OWNER OF THE PROPERTY 
DESTROYED. 
ARGUMENT ON BOTH POINTS 
It is the Appellants contention that there are cer· 
tain basic rules that must be considered in determin· 
ing who is entitled to the proceeds from Fire Insurance. 
In the State of Utah, every married woman has a 
separate estate of property whether it was acquired 
before or during marriage. She may hold same, as if 
she were unmarried, (See Utah Code Annotated 
30-2-1). 
All conveyances betWeen husband and wife are the 
same as conveyances between other persons. (See Utah 
Code Annotated 30-2-3). 
The husband owes the duty of support to his wife, 
including food, fuel, power and protection. 
The basic rule in insurance law is that an insur-
ance contract is one for indemnity and not for profit, 
and contractual or legal liability is imposed upon the 
insured to account to the real owner for the property 
destroyed. (See 68 ALR 1344). 
In the instant case the basic question is whether 
or not the fact that the husband had the insurance 
policy in his name should allow him to, through his suc-
cessor as administratrix of his estate, to take the pro-
ceeds received from the property and distribute them 
out to his heirs, or whether the procceeds should be used 
to reimburse the parties who are entitled to said prop-
erty, and who suffered the loss as a result of the fire, 
namely, Lila Shand Anderson, his wife, and through 
her, her successors in interest, the Appellants in this 
action. 
The authorities are clear that the only person al-
lowed to recover on an insurance contract is a person 
with an insurable interest. Originally the cases stated 
that a person other than the legal title owner could not 
insure the property of another. 
Richards, on Insurance, Section 515, states that if 
each one of several persons having an insurable inter-
est in property were allowed to take out separate insur-
ance to its full value, and had the right under his policy 
to separate collection for the full value, the moral haz-
ard would be greatly enhanced. The insurance would at 
once be regarded as a matter of promising speculation, 
and any loss by fire so far from being a misfortune 
would be a source of gain to the Insured. 
-9-
The reason for the rule, is that his interest must 
at the time of loss be of such a nature that a substantial 
burden of the fire loss would fall exclusively upon him 
regardless of the technical character of the title. 
There are many cases which hold that a husband 
has an insurable interest when he has resided on the 
property, where he has a life estate therein, all of them 
being exceptions to the general rule, and all being for 
the purpose of allowing a recovery against the insur-
ance company. 
Appellant was not able to find many cases that 
were comparable with the fact situation herein. But, 
in 68 ALR 1348, it did cite cases where recovery was 
allowed, but subject to the person accounting to the 
real owner, for the property destroyed. Most of these 
cases were decided on the basis that the husband who 
was insuring the property in his wife's name, was act· 
ing as an agent for her, the real owner. Kludt vs. Ger· 
man Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 152 Wisconsin 637, 
114 NW 321. 
Where the husband was in possession and had the 
beneficial use of wife's property, the court has held 
that there was nothing in the policy indicating that the 
husband's interest alone was insured, and the transac· 
tion evidenced an intention on the part of the husband; 
to insure his wife's interest on her behalf. 
In Trade vs. Barraclif f, 45 NJR 543, 46 Am Re· 
ports 792, the court held where the husband was insur· 
ing property in his wife's name, he was merely acting 
as an agent for the real party of interest, and alloweo 
him to recover for the real party's benefit. 
There are many cases allowing recovery of the fuli 
amount of insurance, with the amount to be held by th~ 
-1(}-
insured in trust for the real owner. (See Dakin vs. 
Liverpool L & G. Insurance Co., 77 NY 600). 
There are also many cases where there is a trans-
fer of property with the title of the property in the 
prior owner at the time of the loss. In these cases the 
insurance proceeds were held in trust for the new pur-
chaser. See Couch "Insurance 2d," Sec. 25.1. This cita-
iton also states that the husband may act as agent to 
effect recovery on behalf of his wife, the agency being 
implied from the relationship of the parties. "Couch" 
follows the basic rule saying that a husband has no 
insurable interest in his wife's property, but that if he 
has some pecuniary or beneficial interest in the prop-
erty or might suffer some disadvantage from it, he has 
an insurable interest but that in all cases he is merely 
acting as an agent for his wife, for the purpose of re-
covering, and that she is entitled to the property when 
it is recovered. 
Appleton "Insurance Law and Practice," Section 
2109 states that an insurance policy is not void be-
cause the name of the insured is not the name of the 
owner. In Section 2149 it states however, that general-
ly the husband has no insurable interest in the property 
of his wife. (Cites Oregon cases, 133 Pac. 1183.) There 
are again a few cases treating the husband more kindly, 
saying that he has the insurable interest when he has 
certain rights in the property. Once again there are 
cases allowing the husband to recover on an insurance 
policy on his wife's property, but stating that the rea-
son the recovery is allowed is because he is a guardian 
for his wife, or that he holds the proceeds as trustee 
for her. 
-11-
Under Section 1049, of "Law of Insurance," it 
states a wife's property insured (in husband's name), 
and he is a mere trustee, or legal payee of the sum re-
coverable for her use and benefit. It cites Marts vs. 
Cumberland Midual Fire Insurance Company 44 NJ 
L 478 and Miotae vs. Milwaukee Mechanics Insurance 
Company 113 Mich. 166, 71 NW 463. 
Utah Code Annotated 31-19-4 under Fire Insur-
ance, defines "Insurable Interest"-
( 1) No contract of insurance on property or of 
any interest therein or arising therefrom, 
shall be enforcable except for the benefit of 
persons having an insurable interest in the 
things insured. 
(2) "Insurable Interest" as used in this Section 
means any lawful and substantial economic 
interest in the safety or preservation of the 
subject of the insured free from loss de-
struction, or pecuniary damage. 
In National Farmers' Union Property vs. Casualty 
Co., 4 Ut2nd, 286 p2nd 249, 61 ALR2nd 635, recovery was 
allowed to a husband insuring his wife's property on the 
assumption that he was representing his wife's inter· 
ests, and that rule is in conformity with that large class 
of cases which hold that where insured who has merely 
a qualified interest in the property, and who insures the 
property to the extent of its full value is merely acting 
as agent of the real owner, expressly or impliedly, or 
merely as agent for the undisclosed principal. Suffice 
it to say, that in all cases the agent with limited inter· 
ests, acting for the principal, may insure the property 
for its full value, and in cases of loss recover the full 
value, to hold the excess over his interest in trust for 
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the real owner. (Trade Insurance Company vs. Barra-
clif, 45 NJL 543, 46 Am Rep. 792, Waring vs. Indem-
nity Fire Insurance Company, 45 NY 606, 6 Am Rep. 
146, Fox vs. Capital Insurance Company, 93 Iowa 7, 
61 NW 211, and Dakin vs. Liverpool, 77 NY 600.) 
In our present case there is no question but that the 
loss falls upon the Appellants. It is their house and fur-
niture and personal property that has been destroyed 
by fire, and the proceeds on the insurance policy should 
be available for them. It was the Respondent's conten-
tion that because her predecessor paid for the insur-
ance contract she should have the funds payable for the 
loss, even though they concede they do not own the title 
to the property. To allow them to recover would be in-
equitable and give them a great windfall. It is interest-
ing to note that the premiums on the fire insurance 
poylicy were always paid by the mortgage holder, and 
the insurance policy was held by the mortgage holder 
for its protection. Respondent contends that Paul An-
derson paid the payments on the mortgage. This is not 
in dispute and the logical answer is that Paul Anderson 
owed his wife the duty of support, which would cover 
not only fuel, power, telephone, food, but also the mort-
gage payments. He also owed her a duty of protection, 
which the Appellants contend would also cover the pay-
ment of fire insurance protection. 
It appears to the Appellants that this is a situa-
tion where a constructive or resulting trust should be 
established for the benefit of the real owner. 
Equity imposes a constructive or resulting trust to 
prevent one from unjust enrichment. There are many 
:ases holding that a husband is deemed to hold property 
1n trust for the benefit of his wife. Our Supreme Court 
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recently held in the case of Little vs. Alder, 19 Ut2 163, 
428 p2 156, that where separate funds of a woman were 
used to purchase property in her husband's name, that 
he was deemed to hold the said property under a result-
ing trust in her favor, even though the title might have 
been in his name. It holds that under certain circum. 
stances a presumption of resulting trust arises, based 
on the husband and wife relationship. 
It is the Appellants' contention that whenever the 
court has allowed the husband to recover on an insur-
ance policy on his wife's property, that it has been based 
upon a trust or agency theory imposing upon the in· 
sured person the duty to account to the real owner of 
the property destroyed, which in this case would be 
the Appellants. 
The evidence is clear that Lila Shand Anderson 
made very extensive and major improvements on the 
parcel of real property, as shown by the plans Exhibit 
16. The improvements were substantial, being over 
$16,000.00, for repairs and modifications. She placed 
in the home new furniture, equipment and supplies in 
excess of the sum $11,000.00, See Exhibits 13, 17, 18, 
19 and 20. All of these funds are either for furniture 
or personal items or expended on property that was 
given to her by her husband and came out of her own 
personal estate. The fact that the Fire Insurance Policy 
was held in the name of Paul Anderson was in all prob· 
ability an error, because the mortgage holder, Grove 
Mortgage Company had never been notified of any con· 
veyances of the property since it was originally held in 
the name of Adelia Anderson, see Stipulation Page 11. 
As far as the creditor, Grove Mortgage Company, bad 
knowledge of, the home property was still held in the 
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name of Mrs. Adelia Anderson, the first wife of Paul 
Anderson, and there were no records in the creditors' 
hands showing any of the subsequent conveyances. 
In the event of the death of Lila Shand Anderson, 
had the property not been destroyed, it would have gone 
according to her Last Will and Testament, which pro-
vided that her husband, Paul Anderson, have a life es-
tate in said residence, with the residence and the prop-
erty located therein then going to her two daughters. 
Consequently, had the property not been destroyed, the 
appellant's after Paul Anderson's death would have 
received full benefits of same. The only purpose of in~ 
surance is to make whole a person who has suffered a 
loss. There is no conceivable way that you can deter-
mine in this case that the Respondants suffered the 
loss. The Appellants cannot understand how the re-
spondant has lost by reason of this fire. Consequently, 
this is a clear case of unjust enrichment, in Respond-
ant's favor, which is contrary to the basic concept of 
casualty insurance. 
Lila Shand Anderson over the marriage period of 
two years, poured into the residence great sums 
of money out of her personal estate, to make the 
home a place of beauty for herself and her spouse. 
It is obvious from the facts that have been stipulated in 
the record, that her husband was of the opinion that the 
property should be hers because he conveyed it to her 
by Warranty Deed. The fact that the mortgage holder 
did not have knowledge of either the conveyance to Paul 
Anderson or of the subsequent conveyance to Lila Shand 
Anderson indicates that it was never the intention of 
Paul Anderson to take the property away from Lila 
Shand Anderson, by reason of Fire Insurance Policy. 
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The obvious purpose of a fire insurance policy is to 
make whole the person who suffers a loss. 
The Respondents gave testimony to the court for 
the purpose of showing that their father had items of 
personal property in the home. This is not conteste~ 
but it was admitted during cross examination that 
many of these items had been turned in, conveyed away 
or replaced. The important part of this testimony is 
that it was given for the purpose of showing that estate 
of Paul Anderson did claim an equitable interest in 
certain items of personal property. Consequently, it can 
be assumed that they were in essence stating that in all 
fairness, the proceeds from the fire insurance should 
be divided between the parties, in conformity with their 
respective interests in the property destroyed. The 
basic principles of equity would follow this doctrine, 
and it appears to the Appellants that the court in equity 
should have awarded the value of the real property to 
the Plaintiff-Appellants, who were without any ques· 
tion entitled to it, and then the court in equity should 
have made an apportionment as to the personal prop· 
erty proceeds, and divided the proceeds from the fire 
insurance policy, in conformity with the value owned by 
each of the parties. 
This was argued to the court at the time of trial 
without success. The purpose of a trust, as developed 
under the law, based upon the court acting in equity, 
is to prevent an unfairness. It is clearly unfair to allow , 
the respondents the great unjust enrichment of receiv· 
ing the entire proceeds from the destruction of this 
home and personal property- $21,620.00 (after mort-
gage payment), which should have belonged to the Ap· 
pellants, because it was their mother's property that 
was destroyed and they were deprived of it. 
-16-
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CONCLUSION 
Appellants ask the court to reverse the lower 
court's decision, and impress a trust upon the proceeds 
from the insurance and that the Respondents be direc~ 
ed to deliver the sum of $21,620.00 to Appellants for 
the loss they suffered, or in the alternative that the 
court reverse the lower court's decision, and that the 
lower court be directed to apportion the insurance pro-
ceeds, based upon the loss which was caused by fire to 
each of the parties. 
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